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DESPERATE DOCTORS AND ANTITRUST






Not only do rising health insurance premiums make us cringe1—so do the
mistakes of overworked doctors who are trying to make ends meet in the face
of a broken healthcare financing system.  The unfairness in healthcare financ-
ing—that is, the stranglehold that a few powerful insurance companies often
wield over doctors’ reimbursements—has prompted some creative solutions,
including two recent bills in the California Legislature2 and one in the New
York Assembly.3  The bills aimed to loosen healthcare antitrust laws and give
physicians greater bargaining power against insurance companies.
Currently, physicians cannot collectively bargain, so their legal choices for
improving profits4 include:  garnering better contract terms through personal
negotiation, banding together to use federally approved methods,5 or squeezing
in more patients per day.
The prospect of doctors over-scheduling to see more patients each day has
lawmakers worried.  In a recent example of why that worry is justified, “assem-
* Cristina Olson, J.D., 2010, William S. Boyd School of Law at the University of Nevada-
Las Vegas.
1 Healthcare spending made up 16 percent of the gross domestic product of the United
States in 2006, and the U.S. government expects that ratio to increase to 19.5 percent in
2017—at a cost of $4.3 trillion per year.  OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE
& MEDICAID SERVICES, NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS 2007-2017 1 (2008).
2 Assem. 2839, 2007-08 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008); S. 1300, 2008 Leg. (Cal. 2008).
3 Assem. A04301A, 2009-10 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009).
4 Physicians are driven to increase profits because of unsatisfactory reimbursement rates
from insurance companies. See, e.g., THE PHYSICIANS’ FOUNDATION, THE PHYSICIAN’S PER-
SPECTIVE:  MEDICAL PRACTICE IN 2008, at 3 (2008), available at http://www.mcms.org/down
loads/PF_Report_Final.pdf.
5 See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST IMMUNITY LEGISLATION FOR HEALTH
CARE PROVIDERS 7 (2000) for a summary of how individual physicians may use joint ven-
tures or mergers, as long as they do not lead to antitrust violations such as “price fixing,
group boycotts, market division, [and] monopolization.”
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bly-line,”6 cost-cutting practices at a Las Vegas endoscopy clinic led practition-
ers to infect six patients with hepatitis C.7  The six hepatitis C cases represented
a substantial increase from the normal amount of such cases reported in Clark
County—about two per year.8  Clinic staffers dipped dirty syringes into vials of
medicine, contaminating the medicine, and then administered the contaminated
medicine to patients.9  Using those unsafe practices for four years, the clinic
rushed through fifty to sixty colonoscopies or endoscopies per day, five days a
week.10  As a result of these actions, all patients at the Endoscopy Center of
Southern Nevada between March 2004 and January 2008 were urged to
undergo hepatitis tests.11
Recognizing the importance of sound healthcare—but wary about upset-
ting the competitive markets—this country has made efforts in the past ten
years to adjust or work around the antitrust doctrines governing doctors.12
More recently, in 2008, California lawmakers suggested that the state prohibit
the confidentiality clauses that insurance companies attach to the provider reim-
bursement contracts.13  Generally, those confidentiality clauses keep doctors
from sharing their reimbursement arrangement with other doctors.  In 2009, a
New York bill aimed for a different approach:  to straightforwardly allow phy-
sician collective bargaining on reimbursement rates.14  However, the New York
proposal restricted collective bargaining to situations where a single insurance
company had a “substantial market share,” in which case the proposal allowed
the state to “actively monitor” the agreement.15
These bills seemed heaven-sent in the eyes of struggling doctors because
bargaining power would lead to higher reimbursement rates from insurance
companies.16  The state intrusion into insurance-provider contracts had legal
precedent, too.17  Furthermore, the proposals espoused a concept that supports
the free market, and benefits consumers overall, rather than pandering only to
6 See Marshall Allen, Assembly-line Colonoscopies at Clinic Described, LAS VEGAS SUN,
March 9, 2008, at 1, available at http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2008/mar/09/assembly-
line-colonoscopies-clinic-described.
7 Id.
8 SOUTHERN NEVADA HEALTH DISTRICT, OUTBREAK OF HEPATITIS C AT OUTPATIENT SURGI-
CAL CENTERS 130 (2009), http://www.southernnevadahealthdistrict.org/download/outbreaks/
final-hepc-investigation-report.pdf.
9 See id.
10 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Department of Health and Human Services,
Acute Hepatitis C Virus Infections Attributed to Unsafe Injection Practices at an Endoscopy
Clinic—Nevada, 2007, 57 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 513, 515 (2008), availa-
ble at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5719a2.htm.
11 Id.
12 See infra Part II.D.
13 S. 1300, 2008 Leg. § 1 (Cal. 2008).
14 See Assem. A04301A, 2009-10 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009).
15 Id.
16 See, e.g., Cristina Rodriguez, Greater Health Care Transparency on the Horizon, IN
BUSINESS LAS VEGAS, March 23-29, 2007, at 9; Healthcare Financial Management, Provider
Views and Strategies for Price Transparency, May 2007.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 124-126 for the background on a different kind of
“gag clause” that was prohibited from doctor-insurer contracts.
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doctors.  In situations where insurance companies have weak bargaining power
in a market, greater price transparency could help them instead.18
However, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has been critical of sev-
eral previous incarnations of state plans to loosen anticompetitive rules.19  A
common theme in the FTC’s disapproval has been that the proposals conflict
with an antitrust principle in healthcare known as the “state action doctrine.”20
With careful attention to the state action doctrine, a state could success-
fully shift the bargaining power in health insurance markets.  This Note will
examine the legality of bills that open up physician collective bargaining—and
what kind of provisions lawmakers should include to ensure legality and good
policy.  Given the current economic downturn, states must look for ways to
make health insurance more affordable; a low-cost adjustment of collective bar-
gaining rules may be a good solution.  Such an adjustment would not be the
only, or necessarily the best, solution to the healthcare cost crisis that exists in
America, but it would be worthwhile for legislators to consider.  Furthermore,
if lawmakers craft legislation that puts state governments in charge of actively
supervising these policies, the policies can comport with the existing state-
action doctrine and avoid federal antitrust rules that govern healthcare.
Part II of this Note describes the history of the issues involved in physi-
cian collective bargaining, including the antitrust laws that apply to the health-
care industry.  Part III looks at the specific bills that recently made their way
into the California and New York legislatures.  Part IV analyzes the main ele-
ments of those bills against the state-action doctrine, an exception to antitrust
laws that applies when states have a purpose that benefits the public welfare
and actively supervise how parties bypass antitrust rules.  Part IV also offers
recommendations for creating legislation that comports with the state-action
doctrine.
II. HEALTHCARE FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS HARM THE INDUSTRY
BECAUSE OF THE HEAVY-HANDEDNESS OF
LARGE INSURANCE COMPANIES
A. An Overview of Doctor Reimbursement
The face of the American doctor today is worn-out, harried, and regretful.
Though doctors are highly respected, they face struggles that merit our sympa-
18
“Conversely, if a health plan learned that a hospital had granted steeper discounts to
competing insurers, it might ask for the same discount.  Whether providers or health plans
would prevail in this scenario would depend on which had the greater bargaining power.”
MARK MERLIS, NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY FORUM, HEALTH CARE PRICE TRANSPARENCY
AND PRICE COMPETITION 19 (2007), http://www.nhpf.org/library/background-papers/BP_
PriceTransparency_03-28-07.pdf.
19 See, e.g., Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Staff Opposes Ohio Bill to
Allow Physician Collective Bargaining (Oct. 21, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/
2002/10/physicians.shtm; Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Staff Opposes
Washington State Proposal to Allow Physician Collective Bargaining (Feb. 14, 2002), avail-
able at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/02/washphys.shtm; Press Release, Federal Trade Com-
mission, FTC Staff Opposes Alaska Proposal to Allow Physician Collective Bargaining (Jan.
31, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/01/alaskaphysicians.shtm.
20 See infra text accompanying notes 78-85.
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thy.  The main culprits, according to a 2008 survey of 12,000 physicians,21 are
“declining reimbursement,” followed by “demands on physician time,” the lat-
ter clearly a result of trying to make up for “declining reimbursement.”22  The
survey emphasizes that only 17 percent of physicians said that finances of their
practices are “healthy and profitable,” and 60 percent of doctors said that they
would not recommend medicine as a career for the nation’s youth.23
Healthcare struggles have also stretched into the national conscience due
to rising insurance premiums.  The cost and quality of healthcare were two of
the foremost issues in the 2008 presidential election.24  President Barack
Obama resounded with voters by calling healthcare a right, not a privilege.25
Of course, many factors contribute to America’s healthcare crisis.  One
specific factor involves reimbursement.  Physicians who feel slighted by reim-
bursement-rate offers blame their problems on the rise of “managed care” sys-
tems in the early 1990s.26  Through this system, employers abandoned the more
expensive “fee-for-service” insurance system by which insurance companies
passively paid for doctor bills.  Instead, through managed care, employers
began to negotiate healthcare arrangements through insurance companies, leav-
ing doctors entirely out of the negotiation process.27
B. Doctor Pushback Against Managed-Care Insurance
Significantly, as the years of managed-care power have ensued, a number
of physicians have sidestepped the law to resolve their frustrations and garner
better reimbursement rates from insurance companies.  From 1996 through
2006, forty-six antitrust cases involving doctors—most of which were blatant
violations of horizontal price-fixing rules—were prosecuted by the FTC and
the Department of Justice.28  In contrast, these federal agencies prosecuted
about the same amount of cases in the preceding twenty years, from 1976
through 1996; however, most of those situations were much more benign.29
21 See THE PHYSICIANS’ FOUNDATION, supra note 4, at 2.
22 Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement were specifically highlighted as contributing to
this issue. Id. at 3.
23 Id. at 2-3.
24
“Two-thirds of voters said they’re worried about being able to afford the health care they
need.”  Associated Press, Survey:  6 in 10 Say Economy Most Important Issue, THE MONI-
TOR, Nov. 4, 2008, available at  http://www.themonitor.com/news/voters-19505-one-half.
html; see also THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, HEALTH CARE AND THE 2008
ELECTIONS 1, available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/7828.pdf (finding the 2008
economic downturn created worry about health-insurance costs).
25
“I think [healthcare] should be a right for every American.”  Transcript of the Second
McCain, Obama Debate, (October 7, 2008), http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/10/07/
presidential.debate.transcript/.
26 See Thomas (Tim) Greaney, Thirty Years of Solicitude:  Antitrust Law and Physician
Cartels, 7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 189, 197 (2007).
27 Charles S. Ofstein, Comment, Destination Unknown:  Illinois’ Search for a Solution to
the Physician Collective Bargaining Problem, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 443, 446-47 (2002).
28 See Greaney, supra note 26, at 194.
29
“Reflecting the fact that these cases were doctrinally uncontroversial, virtually all were
settled without administrative or judicial hearings.” Id. at 193.
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Illegal collective bargaining among physicians arises in the same ways,
according to a survey of recent consent orders from the FTC.30  A 2007 consent
order, Advocate Health Partners et al., involved a large physician-hospital
organization in the Chicago metropolitan area that represented almost 3000
physicians.31  When a health plan would not raise the reimbursement fees for
physicians, this organization cancelled its members’ contracts with that health
plan.32  The health plan then agreed to fees that were between twenty and thirty
percent higher than stated in its previous contracts.33  That rate increase was
short-lived, though.  The FTC prohibited the 3000-strong doctors’ group from
negotiating collectively for the doctors.34
In 2006, Kansas City doctors caught the eye of the FTC in New Century
Health Quality Alliance Inc.35  In this case, only 127 physicians were members
of Independent Physician Association groups that worked together to collec-
tively bargain.36  Members refused to deal with health plans directly.  After the
FTC prosecuted the group for antitrust violations, it issued a consent order
prohibiting the group from negotiating on behalf of the physicians.37
Professor Tim Greaney, in a 2007 article, stated that the recent violations
of the antitrust rules were significant and suggested two sources of the disobe-
dience.38  First, Professor Greaney observed that government officials did not
strongly enforce antitrust rules, resulting in irresistible possibilities for doctors’
groups to test the boundaries of legal enforcement.39  Second, Professor
Greaney hypothesized that too much uncertainty exists regarding antitrust laws
in the healthcare realm.40
C. Antitrust Laws over Doctors
The broad laws that cover physicians and healthcare include the Sherman
Antitrust Act,41 sections 2, 3, and 7 of the Clayton Act,42 section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act,43 and state-law counterparts of these laws.44
30 The Federal Trade Commission’s 2008 report on its recent antitrust prosecutions includes
thirty pages summarizing administrative decisions regarding illegal price-fixing coalitions,
starting with a 1976 case and showing a marked increase of cases in the 1990s and 2000s.
BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION HEALTH CARE SERVICES AND
PRODUCTS DIVISION, OVERVIEW OF FTC ANTITRUST ACTIONS IN HEALTH CARE SERVICES
AND PRODUCTS 10-40 (2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/0608hcupdate.pdf.
31 Id. at 10-11.






38 Greaney, supra note 26, at 195.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2006) (prohibits conspiracies and monopolies), cited in ABA SECTION
OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK 2 (2004).
42 Id. §§ 13, 14, 18.
43 Id. § 45(a) (prohibits “unfair methods of competition”).  There is no evidence of a state
counterpart within this cite.  The United States Code is obviously federal.
44 See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 5, at 6.
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Congress has authority to regulate insurance through the Commerce Clause,
even though insurance is traditionally a state issue.45  In the 1970s, the FTC’s
Bureau of Competition created the Health Care Services and Products Division,
whose sole responsibility was to investigate healthcare-related antitrust
violations.46
Antitrust laws treat the insurance industry differently than other industries.
Insurers are exempt from some antitrust laws via the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
enacted in 1945,47 though any organization in the “business of insurance” can-
not engage in agreements that “boycott, coerce, or intimidate,” according to the
Sherman Act.48  Congress adopted the McCarran-Ferguson Act to ensure “that
regulation of the insurance industry be left to the individual states,”49 for tax
and other Commerce-Clause purposes.50  However, a report from the House
Committee on the Judiciary stated that the 1979 Supreme Court decision in
Group Life and Health Co. v. Royal Drug “clearly held that McCarran does not
exempt insurers’ dealings with health care providers from antitrust scrutiny.”51
It is the federal government’s responsibility to investigate and prosecute
“exclusionary or collusive activities among health plans.”52
Physicians, on the other hand, have repeatedly failed in their attempts to
exempt themselves directly from antitrust laws.  In the 1975 decision, Gold-
farb v. Virginia State Bar,53 the Supreme Court decided that “learned profes-
sions” were not exempt from antitrust laws.54  That classification included
doctors and was an “affirm[ation] that antitrust laws apply to the healthcare
industry.”55
Also, physicians are not “employees” as defined by the National Labor
Relations Act,56 which governs labor unions.  Most doctors are independent
contractors with rights at hospitals.  Physicians who are employed by hospitals
or by health-maintenance organizations are more likely to be seen as “employ-
45 Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 745-46 (1976); see also ABA SEC-
TION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 5, at 2.
46 BUREAU OF COMPETITION, supra note 30, at 1.  In the 1990s, coinciding with “major
transitions in the delivery and financing of health care,” the Department of Justice and the
FTC issued policy papers detailing how antitrust principles applied to modern healthcare.
Jeffrey L. Harrison, The Messenger Model:  Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell?, 71 ANTITRUST L.J.
1017, 1017 (2004).  Among those policy papers was the U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED.
TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE 1996,
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/1791.pdf.
47 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15.  For more information, see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTI-
TRUST DIVISION MANUAL ch. 2 (4th ed. 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/pub-
lic/divisionmanual/atrdivman.pdf.
48 15 U.S.C. § 1013.
49 See, e.g., Levy v. Lewis, 635 F.2d 960, 963 (2d Cir. 1980).
50 See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 880 (1985).
51 H.R. REP. NO. 106-625, at 44 (2000).  The Department of Justice argued that existing
antitrust laws were suitable to ensure competitive behavior between insurance companies
and healthcare providers.  This argument urged the U.S. House to shoot down a bill that
would have allowed physicians to collectively bargain like they were in unions. Id.
52 Id.
53 Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
54 Id. at 787; see also ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 5, at 1.
55 See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 5, at 5.
56 Id. at 33.
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ees” within the National Labor Relations Board definitions.57  However, some
theories suggest that physicians have lost their autonomy typical of an indepen-
dent contractor with the rise of managed care, turning them more into managea-
ble “employees.”58  This theory has not yet prevailed to give physicians the
right to organize59 that nurses and other hospital workers retain.60
D. Attempts to Allow Doctors to Share Reimbursement Data
Advocates of collective bargaining for physicians have tried at both fed-
eral and state levels to attain antitrust exceptions for doctors.  One failed
attempt at the federal level occurred in 2000, when the Quality Health-Care
Coalition Act of 2000 stalled in a Senate committee.61  The bill, introduced by
U.S. Representative Tom Campbell, came to be known as the Campbell Bill.
The simple, stated purpose of the bill, according to the version sent to the Sen-
ate committee, was, “To ensure and foster continued patient safety and quality
of care.”62
The Campbell Bill induced much controversy, mainly because it would set
physicians free of the competitive economic pressures63 that Americans trust to
regulate markets.  The bill would have given physicians and other healthcare
professionals “engaged in negotiations with a health plan” the same status as
contract-negotiating labor unions recognized by the National Labor Relations
Act.64  The bill also precluded criminal prosecution for good-faith efforts to
comply with the new law.65
Support and opposition to the Campbell Bill in 2000 illustrate this nation’s
feelings of sympathy and fear regarding healthcare pricing.  There was—and
nine years later still is—sympathy for physicians who have been humbled in
the negotiating game.  However, there is fear that upsetting competitive mar-
kets would only create higher healthcare prices and harm innocent patients.
Supporters of the bill saw independent doctors as defenseless victims:  Accord-
ing to one of the bill’s 220 co-sponsors, U.S. Representative John Conyers, Jr.:
“It is unrealistic to expect a local doctor to have anywhere near the financial
capacity or legal wherewithal to negotiate fair or reasonable contract terms with
a multibillion dollar health insurer.”66  Shifting the balance of power would, in
57 Id. at 33 n.103.
58 Id. at 34-35.
59 Id. at 37.
60 Serv. Employers Int’l. Union, Fast Facts, http://www.seiu.org/a/ourunion/fast-facts.php
(last visited Mar. 13, 2010) (Service Employees International Union membership includes
“over 1 million members in the field, including nurses, LPNs, doctors, lab technicians, nurs-
ing home workers, home care workers.”).
61 Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 2000, H.R. 1304, 106th Cong. (2000)
(Thomas.loc.gov states that its last action was referred to the Senate Committee on Health,
Education, Labor and Pensions.).
62 Id.
63 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 5, at 42.
64 H.R. 1304 § 2(a).
65 Id. § 2(b).
66 H.R. REP. NO. 106-625, at 54 (2000).
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Conyers’ view, “maximize consumer choice,”67 because doctors would be
expected to adjust their contracts to provide better care for their patients.68
By contrast, the federal antitrust agencies—the FTC and the Department
of Justice—were fearful of the Campbell Bill.69  The FTC predicted that
“prices for health care services [would] rise substantially,” and noted that insur-
ance premiums and prescription drug prices would affect companies, insured
individuals and the uninsured.70  The unpredictable impact on competitive mar-
ket forces was an apparent concern for Congress; the House Committee on the
Judiciary, which handled the bill, inserted a sunset provision that would have
disintegrated the policy after three years if a General Accounting Office analy-
sis proved unsatisfactory.71
Besides a fear of increased healthcare prices, opponents also disliked how
the Campbell Bill would have trampled on the competitive values that had
given doctors some leeway to band together.72  Under existing law, healthcare
providers may combine in joint ventures if they wish to “sell a new product or
service in the market.”73  Instead of seeing this combination as horizontal
price-fixing, the federal government recognizes it as a risk-sharing structure in
which members compel themselves to operate efficiently.74  The Campbell Bill
would have allowed large groups to form for the sole purpose of negotiating
costs, without regard for how efficiently members of the group operated.75  In
other words, the bill “would [have] substantially eliminate[d] the normal incen-
tives for health care professionals to consolidate only to achieve efficiencies
which enhance their ability to compete, and thereby benefit consumers.”76
Although the Campbell Bill of 2000 failed, states have been more success-
ful in using antitrust laws to benefit doctors in insurance reimbursement negoti-
ations.  States can create antitrust immunity under limited circumstances under
the “state-action doctrine.”  This exemption applies when two elements exist:
(1) when there is a clear, expressly stated state policy for the antitrust immu-
nity; and (2) when the antitrust immunity is “actively supervised” by the state
itself.77
The second prong of the state-action doctrine makes the state a party in
contract negotiations, and the Supreme Court has demanded that the state’s role
be substantial.78  The state seeking to use that exception should take “ultimate
control over the challenged anticompetitive conduct.”79
Using the state-action doctrine, Texas was the first state to adopt the
American Medical Association’s Model State Legislation, which was modeled
67 Id. at 55.
68 Id. at 54.
69 Id. at 29-30, 41.
70 Id. at 35.
71 Id. at 4.
72 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 5, at 42.
73 Id. at 8.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 42-43.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 54.
78 Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1980).
79 Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988).
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after 1995 legislation adopted in Washington State.80  While the Texas Man-
aged Care Freedom of Choice Act did not allow physicians to collectively bar-
gain for reimbursement rates, it did allow them to collectively bargain on
contract terms,81 including practices and procedures relating to children’s care,
methods to decrease costs in managing diabetes, asthma and cardiovascular
disease, and procedures to curb fraud.82
The Texas act derived from model legislation by the American Medical
Association, which, in turn, was based on a Washington State act from 1995.83
Washington State lawmakers attempted in 2002 to expand physician collective
bargaining to include fee negotiations, but the FTC actively opposed that
attempt.84  Specifically, the FTC found that the 2002 Washington bill may not
have “provide[d] the supervisory agencies with the necessary tools to exercise
‘independent judgment and control’ over collective provider conduct.”85
Another method that physicians may use to approach negotiations as a
group, though not directly collectively bargain, is called the “messenger
model.”  This system was authorized in the policy statements issued by the
FTC and the Department of Justice in the 1990s.86  The messenger model
allows an independent agent to gather acceptable contract terms from individ-
ual providers, and then to share the aggregate data with an insurer.  In this
system, a healthcare provider gets a picture of what physicians are generally
willing to accept, then makes contract offers based on that information.87
The messenger model has drawn criticism for several reasons.  One reason
is that it is “cumbersome and administratively unwieldy” to have a third party
shuttle back and forth with information, even with newer rules that allow mes-
sengers to accept contract terms.88  Another criticism is that the messenger
model prompts dishonest behavior by messengers who, not surprisingly,
become much more efficient when they collectively bargain on behalf of their
customers.89  Collusion is especially tempting “in markets in which the number
of competitors is small enough to permit collusion.”90
80 TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 29.01 (Vernon 2003), reprinted in ABA Section of Antitrust
Law, supra note 5, at 77.
81 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 5, at 62-63.
82 TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 29.04, reprinted in ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra note 5,
at 79.
83 Christopher Guadagnino, Physicians Seek Antitrust Waiver:  Legislative Initiatives, PHY-
SICIAN’S NEWS DIG., June 1999, available at http://www.physiciansnews.com/cover/699.
html.
84 See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Staff Opposes Washington Proposal
to Allow Physician Collective Bargaining (Feb. 14, 2002), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/02/
washphys.shtm.
85 Id.
86 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 46, at 126-27.
87 Harrison, supra note 46, at 1018.
88 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 5, at 21.
89 See Harrison, supra note 47, at 1022.
90 Id. at 1030.
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III. RECENT STATE PROPOSALS TO LOOSEN PHYSICIAN COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING RESTRICTIONS MAY COMPORT WITH
FEDERAL ANTITRUST REQUIREMENTS
A. Recent Proposals in California and New York
Some states have introduced bills to give physicians and other healthcare
professionals who negotiate with insurance companies the opportunity to move
closer to collective bargaining.  One bill in California’s 2008 legislative session
attempted to make public the contracts between individual physicians and
insurance companies, opening them up to government and market scrutiny.91
A second bill in California that year would have prohibited insurers from exe-
cuting any “unfair and unreasonable agreement as a condition of entering into
contract negotiations . . . .”92  One bill in New York’s 2009 Assembly aimed to
give state authorities the power to allow or disallow collective bargaining,
depending on whether an imbalance of power existed in the health insurance
market.93
The first piece of legislation that this Note will analyze is Senate Bill
1300, introduced by California State Senator Ellen Corbett.  This bill passed
through the State Assembly’s Appropriations Committee, but the amendments
created in that Committee did not pass muster with the State Senate.94  Cor-
bett’s bill would have prohibited confidentiality clauses in reimbursement-rate
contracts between physicians and insurance companies.95  Existing law in Cali-
fornia required that hospital “chargemasters,” which are scales listing how
much money hospitals are paid by insurers for certain procedures, be made
public; however, the law had not extended to physicians.96  The public release
of the hospital chargemasters was consistent with a move toward healthcare
pricing transparency, a policy aimed at providing cost information to consum-
ers.97  For reasons discussed below, many experts doubt that consumers are
sophisticated enough to interpret complex healthcare pricing data.  However,
supporters of Senate Bill 1300 only articulated concern for consumers, not for
physicians who want to gain bargaining power in contract negotiations.98
91 S. 1300, 2008 Leg. § 1 (Cal. 2008) (The bill would have prohibited any “provision that
restricts the ability of the provider to furnish health care pricing . . . to subscribers or enroll-
ees of the plan or individuals insured by the insurer.”).
92 See Assem. 2839, 2007-08 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008).
93 Assem. A04301A, 2009-10 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3 (N.Y. 2009).
94 S. 1300, 2008 Leg. (Cal. 2007), Current Bill Status, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-
08/bill/sen/sb_1251-1300/sb_1300_bill_20090204_status.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
95 After 2009, such a contract “shall not contain a provision that restricts the ability of a
health care service plan to furnish information on the cost of procedures or health care qual-
ity information to subscribers or enrollees of the plan.”  S. 1300, 2008 Leg. § 1 (Cal. 2008).
96 The California Senate’s Health Committee analyzed the issue during debate of S. 1300 in
March 2008.  S. 1300, Senate Bill Analysis, http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/sen/sb_
1251-1300/sb_1300_cfa_20080325_100427_sen_comm.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
97 Id.  Besides pricing information, some healthcare quality statistics have recently become
available to the public in California. Id.
98 Id. (See the “arguments in support” section of the Senate Health Committee Analysis,
where arguments relate only to consumers).
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The second recent California bill analyzed here is Assembly Bill 2839, the
so-called Health Care Providers’ Bill of Rights,99 which stalled in the State
Assembly’s Appropriations Committee.  That bill would have authorized the
State’s Department of Managed Health Care and its Office of the Insurance
Commissioner to inspect insurer-provider negotiations and contracts to see if
they were “unfair or unreasonable.”  The penalties for such a situation, found
only after notice and a hearing to the suspect company, would have included
suspension or revocation of a state insurance license or administrative penal-
ties.  The bill listed elements that would be found unreasonable, including:
“[A]uthority for the plan to change a material term of the contract,” without
provider agreement, provisions that force a provider to accept more patients
than the provider deems is safe, requirements that providers comply with qual-
ity plans without first receiving notice of those plans, and language that dis-
courages a provider from using an attorney or consultant during contract
negotiations.100  The State Assembly’s Appropriations Committee estimated
that the state would spend $200,000 a year reviewing contracts and confidenti-
ality agreements pursuant to Assembly Bill 2839.101  The committee also pre-
dicted greater costs to California healthcare consumers, stating:  “[T]his bill
weakens contracting confidentiality and leads to higher pricing in the health
care market.”102
The purpose of the bill, introduced by Assemblymember Jared Huffman,
was to codify a November 2007 order by the state’s Department of Managed
Health Care against practices run by Blue Cross of California, a health plan.
The state department prohibited “pre-negotiation” confidentiality agreements,
which Blue Cross of California used to keep consultants from representing
more than one healthcare provider in contract negotiations.  Without those con-
fidentiality agreements, consultants could have used their knowledge of
existing provider reimbursement agreements when negotiating new provider
contracts.  On the other hand, the state found relevant that insurance companies
had enough resources to employ many “contract specialists, actuaries, financial
analysts and outside attorneys,” creating an imbalance in power when negotia-
tions started.103
Opponents to Assembly Bill 2839 said that eliminating the pre-negotiation
confidentiality agreements would result in illegal price-fixing in violation of
antitrust laws.104  Those against the bill stated that insurers were subject to the
same types of confidentiality agreements in that they could not share their rates
with other insurance companies.  Furthermore, opponents said that the terms
“unfair” and “unreasonable” would require state agencies to enforce overbroad
standards.  This would have led to uncertainty in future contract negotiations.
99 Assem. 2839, 2007-08 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008).
100 Id. § 1.
101 Assem. 2839, 2007-08 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008), Bill Analysis at 1, http://www.leg
info.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab_2801-2850/ab_2839_cfa_20080506_154934_asm_comm.
html (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
102 Id.
103 Assem. 2839, 2007-08 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008), Bill Analysis at 5, http://www.leg
info.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab_2801-2850/ab_2839_cfa)20080328_180532_asm_comm.
html (last viewed Mar. 12, 2010).
104 Id.
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The New York bill was introduced in 2000, kept alive until 2004, and
revived in 2007 and 2009.105  Assemblymember Ron Canestrari sponsored the
bill in the 2009 session,106 hoping that fellow lawmakers would subscribe to
the bill’s statement of policy:  “[T]he legislature finds it appropriate and neces-
sary to authorize collective negotiations on patient care issues and on fee-
related and other issues where it determines that health plans have an undue
advantage negotiating the terms of contracts with health care providers.”107
Substantively, the bill allows doctors to collectively bargain with insurance
companies over fees only “[W]hen an individual managed care plan controls a
substantial share of the managed care market,” a conclusion that would likely
be reached by New York state officials.108  The bill would not affect existing
laws banning physician strikes or boycotts of health-insurance plans.109
B. Future Use of the California and New York Bills
This Note takes a limited look at two failed California bills and the 2009
New York bill, though the topic of healthcare reform is much broader than the
issues presented herein.  Specifically, this Note seeks to analyze the legality of
the provisions in those three bills.  It will show how legislation that incorpo-
rates the best provisions of the above bills could pass legal muster.
Importantly, this Note does not reach a conclusion as to whether price
transparency in the healthcare industry will improve choices or long-term
prices for patients.  Such a theory is relevant to the confidentiality agreement
prohibitions110—proving its validity would take into consideration too many
parts for the scope of this Note.111
Consequently, this Note does not attempt to characterize the aforemen-
tioned California bills or the New York bill as the best solution to the health-
care finance problem.  This Note will focus on the pieces to the puzzle that
comprises America’s healthcare crisis.  In particular, this Note asks:  Do strate-
105 Assem. A04301A, 2007-08 Leg. Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009), A04301 Memo, http://assem-
bly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=A04301%09%09&Memo=Y.
106 Assem. A04301A, 2007-08 Leg. Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009), available at http://assembly.
state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=A04301%09%09&Text=Y.




“[P]atients pay an unconscionable price because of these practices through reductions in
patient autonomy and quality of care.”  Kristin L. Jensen, Releasing Managed Care’s
Chokehold on Healthcare Providers, 16 ANNALS HEALTH L., Winter 2007, at 141, 141.
111 Becky Sutherland Cornett published a clear and concise summary of the price trans-
parency theory; among other issues she noted that, “‘Informed choice’ isn’t particularly
relevant in our present health care system because traditional market forces do not apply to
health care services.”  Becky Sutherland Cornett, Transparency in Health Care:  Through a
Glass, Dimly, 9 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE, Sep.-Oct. 2007, at 47, 48.  One simple expla-
nation is because healthcare consumers make financial decisions without knowing the extent
of their future obligations:  Will they need more medical care, for instance?  Will the treat-
ment work?  These so-called episode costs cannot be calculated through dry charts of reim-
bursement rates toward physicians.  This was noted in a report of the advocacy group, the
National Health Policy Forum. MARK MERLIS, NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY FORUM, HEALTH
CARE PRICE TRANSPARENCY AND PRICE COMPETITION passim (2007), available at http://
www.nhpf.org/library/background-papers/BP_PriceTransparency_03-28-07.pdf.
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gies employed through those bills have the potential to improve healthcare
quality and costs?  If so, do those strategies fit with the federal government’s
current antitrust policy and rules?
IV. WITH ATTENTION TO STATE SUPERVISION, COST AND ATTRACTIVENESS
TO PHYSICIANS, RECENT BILLS ANGLING FOR PHYSICIAN
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WOULD BE
GOOD TO RE-CONSIDER
Policymakers should seriously consider the provisions of the two failed
California bills and the current New York bill.  This Note will first analyze why
collective bargaining remains ripe for discussion among state lawmakers
despite being repeatedly rejected in the past.  There is clear physician demand
for a creative solution:  Physicians are using legal debate as well as criminal
disregard of antitrust laws to reach for a solution.  Furthermore, although
Americans value competition, this nation has repeatedly made exceptions for
the healthcare industry; public sentiment would allow an exception for over-
worked physicians.
Secondly, this Note will pick through the provisions embodied in the three
bills, and others, judging which provisions should be presented to state law-
making bodies and which would raise the disapproval of the FTC.  In other
words, this Note will show how physician collective bargaining legislation can
comport with the state-action doctrine exception to federal prohibitions on col-
lective bargaining.  In addition, the analysis will look at the most cost-efficient
ways to implement this policy, given the financial straits of state governments.
A. Lawmakers May Draw Power from Public Outrage
As stated earlier, the changing landscape of insurer-physician reimburse-
ment rates has done more than annoy doctors.  It has made physicians want to
leave the profession,112 has effectively cut spending on staff and equipment,
and has limited time that doctors spend spent with patients.113  The issues seem
to be as imminent, if not more so, as when Congress considered the Quality
Health-Care Coalition Act of 2000 (the Campbell Bill).  The demand for col-
lective bargaining is growing in more than rhetorical terms:  Physicians and
other healthcare providers are being prosecuted by the Department of Justice at
an increasing rate.114
Supporters of the failed California bills unwisely pushed their agenda by
focusing on price transparency—a tenuous policy goal, easily attacked by the
managed care lobby—rather than the livelihood of struggling physicians, a
more tangible, provable concern.  That specific political problem could be eas-
ily avoided, especially if policy anglers use situations like the Las Vegas endos-
copy clinic hepatitis issue to compel public sympathy.115
112 See THE PHYSICIANS’ FOUNDATION, supra note 4, at 8.
113 See id. at 10.
114 See supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
115 See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, lawmakers must recognize that trying to establish physician
collective bargaining is a fair and legally warranted recognition that this nation
has granted regulatory exceptions to players in the healthcare field.  The U.S.
Department of Justice and the FTC operate under the policy that competition,
“[W]ill generally allocate resources efficiently toward users who value them
most.”116  In the mind of the U.S. government, markets work best without gov-
ernment interference, but the government should interfere when it sees price
fixing or large horizontal mergers.117
Despite this mentality, the government is quick to exempt certain indus-
tries from federal antitrust laws.  Professor Maurice E. Stucke, a former Depart-
ment of Justice antitrust prosecutor, noted that his former employer makes
exemptions for “agriculture, export activities, insurance, labor, fishing, defense
preparedness, newspapers, professional sports, small-business joint ventures,
and local governments.”118  Professor Stucke argued that the government
should take a closer look at “what they mean by competition.”119
Therefore, the traditional arguments put forth by insurance companies that
price fixing should not occur among doctors should be viewed with scrutiny.  If
there are exceptions for industries such as agriculture, then the healthcare
industry should also have a similar chance at being subject to exceptions to
antitrust rules.
In fact, the healthcare industry, and its contracts in particular, have already
been subjected to government rules that give doctors greater bargaining power.
As mentioned earlier, doctors may band together in joint partnerships if they
share risks and market a product or a service.120  Also, a form of price negotiat-
ing exists already in the messenger model, and its relation to illegal collective
bargaining becomes clear when the third-party messengers do not fulfill their
duties honestly.121
In addition, states across the nation have required insurance companies—
which are licensed within individual states—to release reimbursement-rate
information from contracts covering hospitals, medical-device suppliers, and
pharmacy outlets.  The National Conference for State Legislatures has com-
piled an extensive list of this type of legislation.122  Also telling is the fact that
price transparency for these groups (but not for individual physicians, yet) has
been a federal policy under the Bush Administration.123
116 Maurice E. Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 951, 957
(2008).
117 Id. at 957-58.
118 Id. at 961-62.
119 Id. at 1036.
120 Supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
121 Supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
122 NATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE LEGISLATION RELATING TO
TRANSPARENCY AND DISCLOSURE OF HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CHARGES passim (2010), avail-
able at http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14512.
123 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Executive Order:  Promoting Quality and Effi-
cient Health Care in Federal Government Administered or Sponsored Health Care Programs
(Aug. 22, 2006), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/08/2006
0822-2.html.
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Furthermore, states have previously interfered in a similar manner with
insurance contracts when they banned another type of “gag clause” in the
1990s.124  This type of gag clause had a direct effect on patients’ options for
healthcare—and it was not a positive effect.  In contracting with a certain insur-
ance company, for example, a doctor had to promise to keep patients unaware
about any treatment options that were not covered by that insurance company.
Managed-care organizations said these clauses were merely protections of pro-
prietary information and other trade secrets.  The managed-care plans said these
clauses were essential for maintaining a competitive managed-care market.125
Federal laws against the practice of including those “gag clauses” were
attempted but failed; however most states had anti-gag clause laws well before
the end of the decade.126
Based on the history of antitrust exemptions for sympathetic industries,
the proposals to further break down competition among healthcare providers do
not seem inappropriate on their face.  Indeed, the national policy to promote
competition is not ironclad.  The banning of another type of confidentiality
agreement in the 1990s—those that prohibited a physician from suggesting
treatment not covered by insurance—signifies that public interest may override
a fondness of our lawmakers and policymakers for market forces.
History also shows that strong opposition to anticompetitive measures
does not always prevail.  Regarding the treatment-option gag clauses, insurance
companies denied that they existed or argued that the clauses merely protected
what was rightfully theirs, i.e., a proprietary system for treating patients.  The
resulting outcry and state legislation showed that the public interest may inter-
fere with proprietary business strategies, even to the point of interfering with
contractual agreements.
B. Best Strategies for Creating Bills to Loosen Physician Collective
Bargaining Rules
If written carefully, legislation that loosens physician collective bargaining
rules could fit within the state-action doctrine, an exemption to antitrust laws
that recognizes the sovereignty of states.  The exemption requires two ele-
ments:  (1) a clear, expressly stated policy by the state government for the anti-
trust immunity must exist; and (2) the state itself must “actively supervise” the
program.127  The doctrine derives from a 1943 Supreme Court case, Parker v.
Brown,128 which allowed California to restrict competition among raisin grow-
ers to stabilize prices.129
The first prong within the state-action doctrine, that the state has a clearly
articulated policy for an antitrust exemption, exists so that any immunity provi-
sion has the obvious—not accidental—support of the state government.130
Therefore, this standard does not require that a state compel anticompetitive
124 Jensen, supra note 110, at 152.
125 Id. at 150-51.
126 Id. at 152.
127 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 5, at 54.
128 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
129 Id. at 352; see also ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 5, at 53.
130 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 5, at 55.
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measures; rather, allowing an exception to competition is adequate for a policy
to fit under the state-action doctrine.131
The second state-action doctrine prong is, as it would seem, the harder test
to meet.  A state must actively supervise an anticompetitive policy, again to
ensure that unintended effects—that is, those that do not stem from state pol-
icy—do not occur.132  One example of insufficient state supervision was enu-
merated in 1988, when the Supreme Court rejected an argument that the
possibility of state-agency administrative review qualified as active state super-
vision.133  In Patrick v. Burget, the doctors in a small town blacklisted an Ore-
gon surgeon because the surgeon chose to compete with them.  When the
surgeon sued, the remaining doctors said that they had an antitrust exemption:
They had a peer-review committee for such problems, and the peer-review
committee was established by the state.  Though the doctors tried to establish
that the state “oversaw” the committee, the Supreme Court found no evidence
of active supervision.134
The line separating sufficient from insufficient state supervision remains
undrawn.  Therefore, state lawmakers that have considered or pursued propos-
als that would allow greater physician collective bargaining often proceed with-
out legal certainty.  In 2002, a legal article by Charles S. Ofstein picked apart
an Illinois statute that would have allowed physician collective bargaining:
Ofstein stated the bill would have failed to meet the second prong of the state-
action doctrine.135  The Illinois bill would have implemented a negative-option
scheme,136 by which the state’s attorney general had twenty days to disapprove
of plans as violating antitrust laws.  The author speculated that this loose con-
trol over policy would not fit within the “active supervision” prong of the state-
action doctrine.137
Both prongs of the state-action doctrine—(1) clear articulation of purpose
and (2) active state supervision of the policy—can be fulfilled through care-
fully written legislation.  This Note will now address several provisions com-
mon to these bills, including (1) prohibiting confidentiality clauses regarding
reimbursement fees in physician-health insurer contracts, as the recent Califor-
nia bills would have done, and (2) pre-approving groups that may collectively
bargain, using a formula that looks at the market control of each party, as the
New York bill would accomplish.
1. Eliminating Confidentiality Clauses in Physician-Insurance
Company Contracts
Legislation that eliminates reimbursement-related confidentiality clauses
might be the simplest, most effective way to achieve greater balance in health
insurance financing.  Additionally, there is a good chance that courts would
131 Id. at 55-56.
132 Id. at 57.
133 See Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100 (1988).  For a discussion of this case, see ABA
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 5, at 57-58.
134 Id. at 101.
135 Ofstein, supra note 27, at 472-73.
136 Id. at 472.
137 Id. at 472-73.
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find that this solution fits into the state-action doctrine.  First, state policymak-
ers would find it easy to articulate a purpose, provided that it aimed to:  (a) give
physicians more bargaining power, (b) reveal price information to the health-
care consumers—that is, everybody—in the state, (c) improve working condi-
tions at medical clinics trying to make profits out of quantity of patients seen
rather than quality of care or (d) any other purpose.  Because opponents of
these plans will attack the usefulness of providing complex pricing schedules to
bewildered patients, who are stressed and untrained in analyzing medical pric-
ing, the first and third goals would best articulate achievable goals by a state.
Whichever goal a state chooses should suffice.  The “clear articulation” prong
is more of a retrospective test than a prospective one, so the important test lies
in the second prong.
The state-action doctrine’s latter test requires active state supervision of a
program that grants immunity to federal antitrust laws.  Of the aforementioned
California bills, the second—Assembly Bill 2839, the so-called bill of rights
for providers—has the better chance of meeting the state-action doctrine test.
Although California would have to spend $200,000 per year analyzing the fair-
ness of insurer-provided contracts, its act of enabling the state managed-care
office to oversee contracts directly would qualify as active state supervision.
Other methods could be enlisted to oversee fairness, including actions that
interrupt the contract negotiation process; however, a review of completed con-
tracts likely will be the most cost-efficient way to implement this procedure.
The first California bill mentioned above, Senate Bill 1300, did not con-
tain the active supervision required by the state-action doctrine.  Instead, the
bill merely outlawed confidentiality clauses.  Of course, this deficiency could
be solved by more careful drafting:  Like Assembly Bill 2839 stated, this
method could have required a state agency to pick through contracts.  A more
directed approach would be to make a state agency verify whether the pricing
schedules are correct, or that the reimbursement rates are presented on a user-
friendly web site.  However, the cost-intensive options—while they would eas-
ily satisfy the “active supervision” prong—seem too wasteful.  Considering
that physicians want pricing information available, policymakers must assume
that physicians would know how to use it.  If the state policy is to give health-
care providers a boost in negotiating power, rather than to help consumers
choose the best-valued doctor, the state could not in good conscience overspend
resources on categorizing price data.
Consequently, legislatures that want to invalidate pricing confidentiality
clauses in insurer-provider contracts could do so without violating the federal
antitrust scheme.  Using the state-action doctrine, a state would only have to
ensure that it actively supervised the situation, which could occur under either
of the ideas embodied in the failed California bills.
Such a regulation is so specific and, essentially, mathematical, that it
would not lead to costly legal battles among negotiating parties and therefore
would likely seem attractive to participants.138  A problem will arise if partici-
pants find loopholes, but rather than forcing the supervising agency to adapt to
loopholes, a state legislature should take on those challenges, knowing that leg-
138 See infra Part IV.B.2.
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islatures meet often and that contracts always have expiration dates.  However,
it is important to note that, because of the length of contracts and the ability of
legislatures to react, there likely would be years between the enactment of this
legislation and the beneficial results of collective bargaining.  By the time the
results would benefit healthcare consumers, states may have a number of other
problems that confuse the results from a simple ban on confidentiality clauses.
Therefore, politicians who support the provision in the California bills would
need strong political will to declare that collective bargaining tools are impor-
tant, despite the ongoing presence of other medical issues that evoke more pub-
lic sympathy.
2. A State’s Pre-approval of Doctors’ Groups
New York Assembly Bill A04301 from the 2009 session may fulfill the
“active supervision” requirement of the state-action doctrine, importantly with
a mechanism to lower the state’s cost, as long as specific guidelines direct the
decisions of the state agency tasked with pre-approving physician collective
bargaining sessions.  As with the previous California bills, a bill containing this
language must articulate a clear purpose; the actual New York bill does this
with its statement of intent, reading that it aims to correct a situation where
“health plans dominate the market to such a degree that fair and adequate nego-
tiations between health care providers and the plans are adversely
affected . . . .”139
The bill would lower New York’s “state supervision” cost by charging a
fee—to be determined by the state agency responsible for oversight—to parties
that wish to use the bill to collectively bargain.140  The fee would return to the
state’s general fund rather than directly to the department responsible for over-
sight.  Importantly, the fee would not have a direct correlation with the
agency’s activities, and it seems clear that the agency would end up costing the
state much more than the legislators may expect.  Because fee reimbursement
contracts represent such an important element of the business model for both
physicians and managed care providers, policymakers should expect that each
side would hire consultants, lawyers and anybody else to take fullest advantage
of the state’s new allowance for collective bargaining.141  The state agency
aims to do more than make an initial pre-approval; it aims to receive and ana-
lyze periodic updates if situations change.142
The New York agency—or the agency of any state—responsible for pre-
approving physician collective bargaining would have to operate under specific
guidelines, according to the FTC’s 2002 letter against a Washington bill that
would have loosened collective bargaining rules for doctors.143  The FTC criti-
139 Assem. A04301A, 2007-08 Leg. Reg. Sess. § 3 (N.Y. 2009), available at http://assem-
bly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=A04301%09%09&Text=Y.
140 Id.
141 See, e.g., Physician’s Computer Company, Seven Steps to Successful Insurance Contract
Negotiations, http://www.pcc.com/practmgmt/business/7step.php (last visited Mar. 8, 2010)
(demonstrating consultant groups that physicians’ groups might hire).
142 N.Y. Assem. A04301A § 3.
143 Letter from Federal Trade Commission to Washington lawmakers (Feb. 8, 2002), http://
www.ftc.gov/be/v020009.pdf.
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cized the Washington bill for allowing physician collective bargaining to occur
after informal reviews, by two agencies, of documents prepared by the parties
seeking to enter negotiations.144  The FTC also found inappropriate that the
Washington bill would not have allowed the agencies to take in public com-
ment—a vital tool in gathering information that self-interested parties would
not have provided.
Although the 2009 New York bill would require ongoing supervision, it
still relies on voluntary input from the parties involved.  Therefore, as written,
the provision likely would not meet the FTC’s approval as complying with the
state-action doctrine.  A better provision would allow for public comment and
autonomous, constant supervision of negotiations by the state agencies.  How-
ever, both of these additions, while they would help the state comply with fed-
eral antitrust law, would cost the state more money.
A simple solution to the cost dilemma would be to raise fees on the physi-
cians groups that seek to participate.  However, creating a policy that is unat-
tractive to participants could backfire, as Washington State lawmakers
witnessed following a measure enacted in 1995.  There, the state allowed physi-
cians to negotiate collectively with insurance companies on elements of con-
tracts excluding fees.  However, the program attracted so few physicians that it,
“[F]ailed to create a critical mass large enough to induce health plans to engage
in any negotiations with the (Washington State Medical Association) negotia-
tion service . . . .”145  In the end, consumer and interest group outrage regarding
HMO contract practices led to what the 1995 Washington legislation was
designed to achieve.146
Therefore, a better-worded provision to pre-approve and monitor con-
tracting groups would meet state-action doctrine requirements; however, such
legislation might be undesirable because of cost to the state.  Again, the collec-
tive bargaining solution is good to try, but during an economic downturn, it is
not worth consideration if the economic benefits seem tenuous or even
unlikely.
V. CONCLUSION
Countless ideas exist to solve the healthcare crisis, and many touch on
antitrust issues.  Policymakers should keep their minds open to all possibilities
that do not immediately violate the federal antitrust laws that are enforced by
the FTC or the Department of Justice.
That said, the ideas embodied in two recent California bills—though the
bills have since failed—and the current New York bill deserve the attention of
experts aiming to solve this country’s healthcare crisis.  In the 2007-2008 legis-
lative session, Senate Bill 1300 and Assembly Bill 2839 both aimed to ban
confidentiality agreements in reimbursement-rate contracts between insurers
and healthcare providers.  These confidentiality agreements came either before
or after negotiations, and both seemed to give unfair benefit to large insurance
144
“Both are written documents prepared unilaterally by providers,” the letter complained.
Id.
145 Guadagnino, supra note 83.
146 Id.
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companies, especially in comparison to solo-practice doctors.  In 2009, New
York Assembly Bill A04301 would have allowed physician collective bargain-
ing over fees, provided that the potential participants receive pre-approval from
a New York agency.
Because of the importance of healthcare, and the recent shifts in medical
financing, this idea is ripe for analysis among policymakers.  Furthermore,
breaking open the aforementioned confidentiality clauses does not seem obvi-
ously violative of federal antitrust laws.  Specifically, legislation could be writ-
ten to comport with the state-action doctrine that allows states to give antitrust
exemptions if the state actively ensures that the exemption results in the
achievement of state goals.
The important element for policymakers to remember is to try to create
laws that fit within the state-action doctrine—which requires heavy supervision
by a state—without spending too much money and without making the new
program too unattractive for physicians to participate.  Also, policymakers
should articulate the right reasons for making this change.  Their constituents
are likely unsympathetic to skirting antitrust laws, especially in an era when
large financial institutions damaged this nation’s economy, and especially if an
insurance lobby can easily attack lawmakers’ policies.  The best policy argu-
ment would be the following:  Loosening physician collective-bargaining rules
should not be expected to solve the healthcare financing dilemma, but rather
should be seen as a low-cost, legal solution that chips away at the problems that
physicians and their patients face regarding high-cost health insurance.
